Indonesia, Athukorala (2001) on Malaysia and Warr (1999 , 2005 on Thailand, as well as Corden (2002) on exchange rate policies and experiences. In addition, I
have benefited from Lee and Rhee (2007) on Korea, and Siamwalla (2005) on Thailand.
THE BOOM
In the four countries, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Korea, there was an investment boom financed both by local savings and by foreign capital inflow. This was a familiar story-such booms did happen, even when capital markets are closed to capital inflow or outflow. But this one was truly international. Significant capital account opening in the early 1990s in Thailand, Korea and Malaysia played a key role in the story. The explanation for the boom was simple-the countries' macroeconomic policies and outcomes were very favourable when compared with those of other developing countries; budget deficits were low and in some cases there were surpluses; and inflation was low and growth rates were high. These countries were the stars of the developing world.
In Thailand and Malaysia, new industries for exporting manufactures were established or further expanded as a result of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as local investment financed in Thailand, in part, by foreign borrowing. In Korea, internationally successful conglomerates (Chaebols) were financed to enable further international expansion. Stock market values rose. These countries indeed looked good. They were part of the 'Asian miracle'. I have the impression that much of the investment, especially in the early part of the period, was sound. This was probably true especially in the case of investment in Thai and Malaysian export industries.
As usual, the booms went too far. There was 'irrational exuberance' not just in the countries themselves but also in the world capital market. In Thailand and Malaysia, where the funds initially went into developing manufacturing industries, real estate booms developed and these got out of hand. Investment shifted from manufacturing to construction. In both countries, there was a huge stock market boom. All of this was bound to come to an end. The four countries had been very successful, but they were not perfect. There was a lack of transparency in investment allocation, and excessive political influence on bank lending.
The various crises earlier in Latin America-other than the 1994-95 Mexican crisis-had originated in excessive borrowing by the public sector, including parastatal enterprises. By contrast, the Mexican crisis was the first post-World War II crisis originating in the private sector, and this East Asian crisis was again a private sector crisis. Indeed, one reason why the flow of international capital to these countries accelerated after 1994 was the rebound from the Mexican crisis. For some years Mexico had been the largest recipient of private funds flowing to 'emerging markets'.
While inflation was generally low when compared with Latin America, there was real appreciation with nominal exchange rates more or less fixed to the US dollar (or moving closely with it) and domestic prices and wages rising somewhat faster than in the United States and other trading partners. In some cases, notably Thailand and Malaysia, there were large current account deficits, this being the way in which capital inflow was transferred into the economy. These deficits were not really a separate phenomenon but were a part of the capital inflow story.
During the boom, capital inflow took essentially three forms. First, there was FDI, which was important in Malaysia, but to a lesser extent in Thailand and Indonesia and restricted in Korea. Flows of such investment seemed to have been fairly stable, and not changing in response to 'herd effects' (investor sentiment moving en masse together). Nevertheless, surely the flows would in time have responded somewhat to changes in expectations about exchange rates and investment profitability. Second, there were inflows of portfolio capital into local stock markets.
This was particularly important in Malaysia. Finally, there was short-term borrowing from the world capital market by local banks and other financial intermediaries, and also by corporations, all in the form of debt-creating instruments. The lenders were international banks and also mutual funds, pension funds, and so on. The debts were (almost) all denominated in US dollars. Both portfolio capital and short-term borrowing were highly responsive to changes in expectations, and lacked the relative stability of FDI. It was a particular feature of the boom that so much of it was financed by highly mobile capital in the form of short-term borrowing and, to a somewhat lesser extent, also in the form of portfolio capital.
THE BUST AND THE TRIGGER
It may be inevitable that a boom comes to an end some time, but not necessarily a sudden end. There could be a 'soft landing', with a gradual decline in investment and capital inflow. But the 'herd effect' in the international capital market may lead to a sudden end in the form of a crisis, which would be a 'hard landing'. Usually it is not possible to predict whether there will be a soft or a hard landing and, if the latter, when it will take place. One can see the possibility of a crisis but cannot really predict it. This applied as much to the East Asian crisis as it does now to a frequently predicted 'dollar crisis', or indeed a housing crisis in various countries A hard landing usually has to have a trigger of some kind. But the trigger is not the fundamental cause of a crisis. In these four Asian countries, the fundamental cause was the inevitable ending of the investment boom owing to eventual overinvestment, and the financial difficulties that an excessive boom was causing. In the case of Thailand, the trigger was a combination of domestic and external factors that led to a drastic collapse in the growth rate of exports (from over 20% a year to about zero) in 1996, and thus to an increase in the current account deficit. I shall come back to that later. This led in 1997 to an exchange rate crisis in Thailand, with the Thai currency (the baht) depreciating from 26 baht to the dollar to 47 baht. In the case of the other three countries, the trigger was this Thai depreciation.
Suppose there had not been a sudden and drastic depreciation of the baht, would there still have been crises in the other three countries? This is a relevant question because it is often argued that international action is needed to avoid contagion. And when an event in Thailand sets off crises in Malaysia, Indonesia and (after some lag) Korea, for example, it is indeed a case of contagion. The answer has to be that, for fundamental reasons, the booms in the latter three countries had to come to an end, but if there were no trigger there would be a soft rather than a hard landing, and hence no crisis. Yet it is also possible that, in the absence of the Thai exchange rate crisis, eventually there would have been some other trigger. My general conclusion, at this point, is that the fundamental cause of the crisis was that there had been investment booms that ended in a period of 'irrational exuberance'. Both lenders and borrowers, as well as financial intermediaries, should be blamed for this. It was not predictable that the boom would end in a crisis, but it was certainly a possibility. The sharp decline in investment caused recessions in all countries, with a multiplier effect literally multiplying the effect of the investment slump as reflected in a decline in consumption. As shown in Table 1 The Indonesian target zone regime was somewhat (and not very much) more flexible.
The first point is that, if the exchange rates had floated and if the underlying changing expectations about investment profitability had been the same as they actually were, then there would still have been a boom followed eventually by a soft or a hard landing.
During an investment boom, nominal exchange rates would have appreciated, Thus the currency crisis clearly followed the investment and banking crises after a lag of one year or more. Here it should be noted that, as Warr (2002) The story was much the same for Korea. There was clear evidence of a financial crisis, or at least difficulties, well before the currency crisis (Krueger and Yoo, 2001 ). There had been excessive lending to unsound borrowers; the terms of trade deteriorated in 1996; and confidence was shaken by evidence of problems in the banking system. Only late in 1997 was there a currency crisis forcing abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime.
In the case of Malaysia, well before the currency crisis, the stock market had risen to excessive heights and there were signs of banking problems. Again, in the case of Indonesia, the fundamental problems were much the same. Because of the lack of data then, however, there was less awareness of an international borrowing binge and thus of a likely problem. In this case the exchange rate crisis-triggered by the Thai depreciation-came first, and the financial crisis followed.
THE CURRENCY MISMATCH-UNHEDGED FOREIGN BORROWING
I now come to a very important aspect of the whole story, which does not apply to Malaysia but does apply to the other three countries. Borrowing in the form of debt, primarily from international banks, was short term and was generally denominated in US dollars. This was not hedged against the possibility of a devaluation or depreciation of the domestic currency. Why this was so is a subject for discussion, but I will temporarily pass over this question. The consequence of such lack of hedging was that, when the domestic currency depreciated sharply-hugely in the case of the Indonesian rupiah, big losses were incurred by domestic banks that had acquired international debts in dollars and had on-lent domestically in local currency. There was a 'currency mismatch' which then created balance sheet problems. In some cases, as particularly in Indonesia, but also in Korea, local non-financial corporations borrowed abroad from international banks in US dollars (without the intermediation of local banks) and so also acquired the currency risk. Sometimes local banks lent in dollars to local firms, so that the firms then carried the currency risk and the banks acquired a credit risk.
In all these cases, balance sheets of banks and of corporations were severely affected by the exchange rate depreciations that resulted from the ending of the investment boom. In fact, many banks and corporations were bankrupted. Thus the currency crisis greatly added to the financial crisis because of the currency mismatch problem.
I suggested earlier that the exchange rate regime may not have made much difference to the fundamentals-even with a floating rate there would have been an investment boom that was followed eventually by a slump. Whether the exchange rate was initially fixed and then depreciated in a currency crisis, or whether it had floated and simply depreciated within the floating rate regime once capital inflow declined, the basic story would have been much the same. But now there is another factor to take into account, namely, the balance sheet effects of unhedged foreign borrowing denominated in foreign currency.
I come now to the reason why there was a failure to hedge against the consequences of the currency mismatch. In a floating rate regime, the demand for hedging is likely to develop and an appropriate market for hedging will emerge. The experience of variable exchange rate values makes a desire to hedge likely, and perhaps even inevitably (as in Australia). By contrast, in the fixed rate regimes the need for hedging was not perceived because a breakdown in the regimes was thought highly improbable. But, when the regimes did actually break down, the currency mismatch caused balance sheet problems that had not been hedged against, and which thus damaged banks, other financial intermediaries, and corporations that had borrowed in dollars but expected to receive income in domestic currency.
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THE RECESSIONS
In all four countries, there were deep recessions in 1998. One can break down the several elements that caused the decline in demand and thus the recessions.
First, there was the decline in investment that started off the crisis. Second, there was the financial crisis caused by the excessive domestic lending and by the decline in asset values resulting from the change in expectations. The difficulties of banks and other financial firms led to a drying up of new credit. One might say that the boom in the lending had been very unwise, and now the country had to deal with the consequences. Third, there was the reduction of private consumption resulting from the multiplier effect of the two shocks just mentioned. Finally, there were the consequences on balance sheets of the currency mismatch that I have just discussedthe reduction of credit by domestic banks and the reduction of spending by corporations, both resulting from the adverse effects of the currency mismatch on their balance sheets. The bigger was the crisis depreciation of the exchange rate, the bigger was this effect. Since the Indonesian depreciation was huge, it is not surprising that this adverse effect of currency mismatch in Indonesia was also huge.
2 It can be argued that hedging was not available because it would require foreigners to take exposure. Hedging will shift risk, not eliminate it. That is correct. But one has to explain why foreigners, ever in search of profits, did not get into this business. They would profit if the event ensured against does not happen. If it does happen-i.e. if the rupiah does depreciate-they would have to sell dollars and buy rupiah. They thus must be prepared to take exposure. But taking on risk is the business of (say) hedge funds. I therefore conclude that hedging was potentially available, but there was no demand. If demand had emerged, supply would have emerged as a result. In the case of Indonesia, where the exchange rate was not absolutely fixed, the market only expected moderate exchange rate changes, and hence there was no demand for hedging. The extreme event that actually happened was thought inconceivable. Ron Duncan has also pointed out that hedging is very difficult, if not impossible, with fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates because changes in the rate occur at the whim of governments, so that the market cannot assess the risk. There is no probability distribution upon which it can base a financial derivative.
THE POLICY RESPONSES
There were three possible policy responses, and all were eventually pursued in all four countries.
Moderate the Depreciation
The first policy response was to try and moderate the depreciation by raising the domestic interest rate and by various measures that would restore the confidence of foreign investors and, indeed, also of local investors in the currency. This was very much the focus of initial IMF advice or conditionality. The main concern was to minimise the impact of the currency mismatch effect-the less the depreciation, the less would be the harmful effects on the financial sector. In addition, it was thought that fiscal and monetary tightness would improve confidence and thus moderate the depreciations.
The major problem about monetary tightness, designed to moderate depreciation, was that there is an obvious trade off. The higher is the domestic interest rate, the more deflationary will be the effect for those firms that depend on domestic 
Rescue the Banks
The second response by the governments or the central banks was to rescue the private banks so as to save the financial system. Banks were in trouble because of their initial unwise lending in the boom and the subsequent declines in asset values.
They suffered further from the balance sheet problems just discussed, and finally from the lack of demand that caused the recession, also just discussed. Restoring the financial system was important because consumption and investment demands depend on the availability of credit. Furthermore, the depreciations should stimulate exports-which eventually was indeed an important source of restored demand for the country's products, but which depended on trade credit. In the short run a shortage of trade credit was a serious problem in Indonesia.
Hence governments through asset management companies bought nonperforming loans. They financed this by the issue of government bonds sold to domestic or foreign buyers (i.e. fiscal policy), by foreign official loans (including loans from the IMF), or by money creation. The last would increase the depreciation and thus worsen the balance sheet problem. In any case, restoring the financial system by rescuing banks and other financial intermediaries was an objective in all countries.
In the case of bond finance and foreign loan finance, the costs of unwise or unlucky borrowing and lending were, at least to some extent, transferred from private sector borrowers and lenders to the taxpayers of the four crisis countries. Lee and Rhee (2007:150) write about Korea that 'the expansionary fiscal policy after the crisis successfully stimulated the economy and facilitated the development of financial markets'. They note that the ratio of sovereign (i.e. government) liabilities to GDP increased from less than 6% before the crisis to 32% 
Keynesian Demand Expansion
The third possible policy response was to compensate for the decline in investment demand and the various other sources of the recession outlined above with a domestic demand expansion. This was a straightforward Keynesian policy. It included various increases in public expenditure (such as food subsidies) designed, for example, to help the poor and the unemployed. One might also think here of public sector infrastructure investment as a traditional Keynesian counter-cyclical policy, but the difficulty in this case is the inevitable lag in planning and executing such a policy.
Deliberate reductions in interest rates would also be part of such a policy.
Incidentally, one could regard the previous approach of rescuing the financial sector and corporations as being part of this Keynesian approach because it would also lead to demand expansion. But because it creates moral hazard, it is best thought of as being distinct, though having Keynesian effects.
A switch to this Keynesian demand-expansion focus (including rescues of the financial sector) did take place in 1998, as the severity of the recessions became apparent, though the eventual limits were set by the availability of foreign finance. In 1998, this Keynesian approach seems to have been followed in all countries to some extent, but most clearly in Korea and in Malaysia. I advocated it in a lecture in Singapore given in the depth of the crisis in August 1998 (Corden, 1999) .
In practice, all three approaches that I have discussed here were followed in all four countries. The first approach-seeking to moderate depreciations by raising domestic interest rates and tightening fiscal and monetary policies to restore confidence-was followed early in the crisis and was soon abandoned. The second approach-rescuing the banks-was a central feature of public policy right through in all countries. A shift to the third Keynesian approach emerged mostly in 1998, when the seriousness of the recessions became clear. By 1999, exports started increasing as a result of the real depreciations, and gradually domestic demand expansions were less needed.
THE FOUR COUNTRIES; SOME SPECIAL ASPECTS
The next step is to look at some special aspects of each of the four countries.
Thailand
Thailand displayed most clearly the disadvantages of a fixed-but-adjustable exchange rate regime (FBAR). The implications of such a regime-the pros and cons-have been analysed fully in Corden (2002) . Thailand had a strong, long-standing commitment to an exchange rate fixed to the US dollar, and this helped to explain its long history of very low inflation. But when financial institutions got into difficulties around 1996, the Bank of Thailand extended credit to financial institutions, which led to monetary expansion, and this in turn reduced the foreign exchange reserves. In addition, the Bank borrowed from the forward market. A Thai financial crisis was thus already under way when, in 1997, a speculative attack on the baht finally forced the central bank to give up the fixed exchange rate regime and allow the baht to float.
This was a familiar story. It reminded one of the United Kingdom's 1992 crisis when sterling was forced to leave the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In such cases, a central bank makes big losses to the benefit of private speculators. It is worth noting that Indonesia did not get into this situation. As pressure on the rupiah mounted, the Indonesian authorities quickly gave up their target zone regime and allowed the rupiah to float. Here I should mention that Indonesia did not have a strictly fixed rate regime before the crisis, but something close to it-a narrow target zone within which the rate floated, and a central rate that had a modest rate of crawl. This did mean that its exchange rate regime was more flexible as soon as the crisis broke. Malaysia and Korea also did not hang on to their (more or less) fixed exchange rates for very long. In this respect, Thailand was special.
Indonesia
Indonesia had the biggest exchange rate and growth decline, and the slowest recovery.
Why was this? Its initial economic position appeared to have fewer problems than the other three countries (Hill, 2000) , though to some extent that was only an 'appearance' because inadequate data did not reveal certain problems of excess or unwise investment. But the main point, I wish to stress here, is that in Indonesia an economic problem interacted with a potential political problem. This political problem was that of the succession to elderly President Soeharto, and, in addition, his declining ability to manage the country. Each problem-the economic problem and the political problem-was made worse by the other. The trigger was a depreciation of the Indonesian rupiah caused by the Thai depreciation, a straight case of contagion.
Because of the usual currency mismatch, this then caused a balance sheet problem for banks and for corporations that had borrowed directly overseas in dollars. That is a familiar scene-efforts to rescue banks were financed by money creation, and this increased the depreciation. Indeed, for a period in early 1998, Indonesia lost control of monetary policy, though inflation was brought under control by late 1998.
The extreme depreciation that came about and that created huge currency mismatch problems was caused by a loss of confidence in President Soeharto's government. One reason was that the IMF-which had been brought in quickly to support the exchange rate-set conditions that were unacceptable to him, conditions which would weaken the influence of and gains to the Soeharto family. Basically he rejected IMF conditions. In addition, there was uncertainty about his health and the succession. The Chinese business minority lost confidence in their security, and that added to the flight of capital.
Thus one can say that the economic problem-triggered by the Thai depreciation-in turn triggered a political crisis, the potential for which had already existed, and this political crisis in turn worsened the economic problem through increasing the depreciation of the rupiah and thus the currency mismatch effect on banks and corporations. This argument sounds complicated, but is actually oversimplified. It is an attempt to explain why the effects of the East Asian crisis have been much more severe in Indonesia than in the other three countries even though Indonesia's initial macroeconomic situation appeared quite good.
Korea
There are, of course, many special features of Korea, which is by far the largest economy of the four Asian crisis countries. Here I will just note two.
The first is that more assistance was granted to Korea by the IMF and the United States than to the other countries. The Korean crisis was seen as a bigger threat to the world financial system because of the size of the economy and especially the very high short-term debts incurred by Korea's corporate sector and their associated banks (the Chaebols).
The first financing package, arranged by the IMF at the end of 1997, was primarily concerned to deal with the major drain on the capital account coming from bank debt repayments (resulting particularly from offshore borrowing by overseas branches of Korean banks). The IMF's own funds were quite modest (partly because the Korean IMF quota relative to its GDP was quite small), and so a crucial element of the package consisted of promises from various bilateral sources, notably the United States, but also from other developed countries. But this was not sufficient-or sufficiently certain-to restore market confidence, so Korea's foreign exchange reserves dwindled rapidly. This then led to an important and successful development, namely the 'coordinated roll-over' (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003:114-5) .
Under pressure from the governments of creditor countries, the creditor banks of the various countries agreed to 'roll-over', that is, to maintain their existing credit lines (i.e. not to require repayments of short term credits) and also agreed to extension of maturities of their claims on Korean banks. This was successful in restoring liquidity and hence confidence. All the extended loans were eventually repaid by the original Korean borrowers. In fact, 90% was repaid by April 2000, though only 63% was scheduled to mature by that date (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003) .
The other special feature of Korea was that its recovery was faster than that of the other countries. Already in 1999 the Korea growth rate was 9.5%. By contrast, the Thai growth rate in 1999 was 4.4%. This rapid recovery of Korea was explained by the switch to expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in the middle of 1998.
According to Lee and Rhee (2007) , this was made possible by the structural changes that had been brought about very quickly and effectively in 1998. There were many public credit guarantee programs. In their view (P152), 'counter-cyclical fiscal policy can be quite effective when combined with financial restructuring'. The IMF's Independent Evaluation Office (2003:109) noted that 'public funds totalling over 20 per cent of GDP would eventually be committed to cleaning up the banking sector'. It certainly helped that, before the crisis, Korea had a very low ratio of public debt to GDP (6%).
To conclude discussion of the Korean experience, it would be interesting to make an in-depth study comparing the reactions to the crisis in Thailand with that of The other special feature of Malaysia was that, in 1998, its government imposed controls on short-term capital outflows, in particular on the repatriation of portfolio capital by non-residents, as well as on speculative positions against the currency. After a year these controls were modified, but they did give more freedom to fiscal and monetary policies, allowing the domestic interest rate to fall below the US interest rate. There is some evidence that these measures allowed the recovery to be somewhat greater or earlier than in Thailand. The controls may not have made a big difference, but in the judgement of Athukorala, with which I agree, the net effect was beneficial (Athukorala, 2001 , Corden, 2002 .
It is clear to me that controls on short-term international capital flows, whether inflows or outflows, should not be ruled out, at least in particular circumstances. But one has to keep in mind that there are administrative problems. For that reason alone the controls were more suitable or indeed more feasible for Malaysia than for Indonesia. Furthermore, the benefits of free portfolio inflows and outflows must also be taken into account.
WAS IT A LIQUIDITY CRISIS?
At last, I come to the 'liquidity versus solvency crisis' issue. In a very thorough discussion of the East Asian currency crisis, Ito (2007:43) concludes that "in summary, many believe that the Asian crisis was a 'liquidity crisis' rather than a 'solvency crisis' with fundamental structural problems". Thailand and Indonesia since the major lenders were harder to identify These remarks concern the governments and their central banks. But the story is somewhat different with regard to the private borrowers-especially the banks, but also corporations-in the four countries. Here I would say that there was indeed a solvency crisis resolved eventually by the governments and central banks. The details varied by country, but it is clear enough to me in the Korean case that there was a transfer of debts to the government-that is, the taxpayers. The Chaebols and their banks were not in a position to repay. The non-performing loans that were bought by the government did turn out to be at least partially non-performing. But they were always bought at a discount. It is hard to generalise here, but there may be a moral hazard issue in this case, especially for the foreign lenders who mostly lost very little. cannot pursue here. It is one which is familiar to students of central banking, and which underlies much of the discussion of the role of the 'domestic lender of last resort' in Kindleberger and Aliber (2005:195-210) .
CONCLUSION
Let me reiterate that this lecture has not been concerned with assessing the role of the IMF, even though I have touched on this at various points. The role and presumed failures of the IMF are interesting and much debated subjects which are probably discussed most thoroughly with regard to Korea and Indonesia in the IMF's own report by the Independent Evaluation Office (2003).
The main point, in my review here, has been that there was a prolonged investment boom followed inevitably by some kind of slump. An ending to the episode in the form of a 'hard landing' was neither inevitable nor predictable, but was set off by events in Thailand and reinforced in Indonesia's case by political factors. I have discussed the relationship with the exchange rate crises and the serious impact of short-term foreign borrowing that was denominated in foreign currency, usually dollars, and was unhedged. There were several policy responses, notably efforts to rescue the banks and various private corporations, and these rescues were generally expensive to the public sector. Only in the Korean case was there a systematic attempt to get foreign creditors to reschedule the payments they were owed. There were some special features of each of our four countries. In particular, in Indonesia, there was an interaction of a political with an economic crisis, while Malaysia did not incur significant short-term debts-unlike the other three crisis countries-while Thailand adhered too long to a fixed exchange rate. As I have said at the beginning of this lecture, I have not tried to make a grand assessment of the causes of the crisis and policy responses, and of how something similar might be avoided.
